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Abstract—Byzantine general problem is the core problem
of the consensus algorithm, and many protocols are proposed
recently to improve the decentralization level, the performance
and the security of the blockchain. There are two challenging
issues when the blockchain is operating in practice. First, the
outcomes of the consensus algorithm are usually related to the
incentive model, so whether each participant’s value has an
equal probability of being chosen becomes essential. However,
the issues of fairness are not captured in the traditional security
definition of Byzantine agreement. Second, the blockchain should
be resistant to network failures, such as cloud services shut down
or malicious attack, while remains the high performance most of
the time.
This paper has two main contributions. First, we propose
a novel notion called fair validity for Byzantine agreement.
Intuitively, fair validity lower-bounds the expected numbers that
honest nodes’ values being decided if the protocol is executed
many times. However, we also show that any Byzantine agreement
could not achieve fair validity in an asynchronous network, so
we focus on synchronous protocols. This leads to our second
contribution: we propose a fair, responsive and partition-resilient
Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating up to 1/3 corruptions.
Fairness means that our protocol achieves fair validity. Respon-
siveness means that the termination time only depends on the
actual network delay instead of depending on any pre-determined
time bound. Partition-resilience means that the safety still holds
even if the network is partitioned, and the termination will hold
if the partition is resolved.
For the performance, our Byzantine agreement outdoes the
state-of-art synchronous protocols. Precisely, the expected round
complexity of our protocol is 6.33 rounds for the static adversary.
For comparison, the protocol proposed by Abraham et al. in
Financial Cryptography 2019 requires expected 10 rounds and
the Algorand Agreement proposed by Chen et al. in Cryptology
ePrint 2018/377 requires expected 8.2 rounds. Moreover, we
conduct an experiment with 21 nodes in 10 regions spanning
3 continents on Google cloud platform, and the results show the
latency of our responsive protocol is 241.79 ms.
Index Terms—Fair, Byzantine agreement, consensus,
blockchain, responsiveness, synchronous network
I. INTRODUCTION
Byzantine agreement is one of the central problems in the
field of distributed algorithms and cryptography. It also plays
an important role in multiparty computation and constructing
cryptocurrencies.
In 1982, Lamport, Shostak, and Pease [1] introduced the
Byzantine general problem: several generals want to make a
consensus on whether they should attack or not, while some
of them may be malicious.
In this paper, we consider the following setting. Suppose
there are n users, of which at most t may be malicious. The
malicious users may deviate from the protocol arbitrarily. Each
user q starts with an initial value vq . All the users want to
decide on one of the initial values, satisfying the following
three conditions:
1) Agreement. Two honest users never decide on different
values.
2) Termination. All honest users terminate in a finite time.
3) Validity. The decision value must be the initial value of
any node.1
The protocol that solves such a problem is called Byzantine
agreement (BA).
A. Byzantine Agreement in Blockchain
The blockchain systems allow many mutually untrusted
users to maintain a distributed ledger with consensus. How-
ever, the long confirmation latency prevents the existing
blockchain systems from many daily applications. For exam-
ple, the confirmation latency of Ethereum is about 5 to 10
minutes. It is unrealistic to wait such a long time for micro-
payment systems.
Recently, some proposals try to overcome the long latency,
but it is challenging to decide who has the right to issue the
blocks and to guarantee that every user shares the same ledger.
Chen and Micali [3] proposed a novel blockchain system,
Algorand, that solves the consensus problem by BA. Pass and
Shi [4] also proposed a blockchain system, Hybrid consensus,
that reduces the latency by BA. The performance and the
security of such blockchain systems highly depend on the
underlying Byzantine agreements, so it is imperative to design
a secure and efficient Byzantine agreement protocol under the
reasonable assumptions for the Internet nowadays.
a) Fairness: The incentive model plays an essential role
in most of the blockchains. It motivates the miners and
validators to execute and follow the protocol. It also relates to
the issue and the distribution of the currency. Consequently,
if we use BA to decide whose block (initial value) is chosen,
whether each participants value has an equal probability of
being chosen becomes essential and directly influences the
economics of the blockchain.
However, the notion of fairness is not captured in the
traditional security definition (agreement, termination, valid-
1The original Byzantine general problem only considers the binary case.
That is, the initial values can only be 0 or 1. The validity is defined as if all
honest nodes start from the initial value b ∈ {0, 1}, then all honest nodes
must decide on b. Here we consider the multi-value case, and we follow the
definition in [2].
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ity). Therefore, to measure the performance of BA protocols,
especially in the context of blockchains, we propose a new
definition of the validity, called strongly fair validity. Intu-
itively, if n users join a BA, the BA protocol satisfies strongly
fair validity if the probability that one’s value is accepted by
some honest nodes is lower-bounded by 1n except a negligible
probability.
b) Synchronous and Asynchronous Network: An exten-
sive literature has studied Byzantine agreement in different
network models. In a synchronous network, there is a priori
known upper-bound λ of the network delay, while an asyn-
chronous network does not have. For convenience, we call the
BA protocols designed for the former model the synchronous
BA and the BA protocols designed for the latter model the
asynchronous BA.
When applying to the blockchain, asynchronous BAs usu-
ally outperform synchronous BAs from two aspects. First,
asynchronous BA has better resistance to network failures.
Although the network nowadays is highly reliable, network
failures happen from time to time. For example, the undersea
cables break or the network services shut down for updating.
In these cases, the network delay may be much longer than
the typical case and the security of a synchronous BA is
not guaranteed. Second, the performance of the synchronous
protocols is limited by the upper-bound λ. On the other
hand, there is no upper-bound for the network delay in the
asynchronous protocols, so the protocols proceed when enough
messages are delivered, which only depends on the actual
network delay.
However, the nature that the asynchronous protocols do not
depend on any pre-determined time bound makes it impossible
to achieve strongly fair validity2. In this paper, we show the
following impossibility result.
Theorem 1. (informal, restated in Theorem 7) In an asyn-
chronous network, no Byzantine agreement tolerating some
Byzantine nodes can achieve agreement, termination and
strongly fair validity at the same time.
Thus, our problem is whether we can have a secure syn-
chronous BA that achieves fair validity while enjoys the
advantages of asynchronous BAs as many as possible? The
answer is positive. In the following, we introduce two desired
properties for designing synchronous BA.
c) Partition-Resilience: Algorand agreement proposed
by Chen et al. [5] is a synchronous protocol. In their work,
they propose a new property, called partition-resilience: a
Byzantine agreement protocol is partition-resilient (PR) if the
agreement always holds even if the network is asynchronous,
and the termination holds if the network becomes synchronous
and all the delayed messages delivered. Notice that “a syn-
chronous BA with PR” is different from “an asynchronous
BA.” For the former, the protocol is still parameterized by a
2In fact, even the weakly fair validity cannot be achieved. We will elucidate
it in Section III.
time-bound λ and some properties3 other than the agreement
may still rely on λ. On the other hand, an asynchronous BA
performs qualitatively the same no matter the condition of the
network.
The network nowadays in highly reliable, so a synchronous
BA with PR enjoys all the desired properties depending on λ
most of the time, while the agreement still holds even if the
occasional failure happens. When applying to blockchains, the
agreement guarantees that the chain will not fork. Thus, PR
is a reasonable requirement of a BA protocol for building a
blockchain.
d) Responsiveness: Recently, Pass and Shi [4] proposed
a blockchain protocol, called Hybrid consensus, whose secu-
rity depends on the a priori known upper-bound λ while the
protocol proceeds as soon as the actual network delay. In [4],
they defined a performance metric called responsiveness: a
protocol is called responsive if its termination time depends
only on the actual network delay δ but not on the a priori
known upper-bound λ.
We borrow the same notion and apply it to Byzantine
agreement. We say a BA protocol is responsive if all the
honest nodes terminate on some values as fast as the actual
network proceeds without depending on any pre-determined
time bound.
e) Weakly Fair Validity: In this work, however, we show
that if a BA protocol only executes once, it is impossible to
achieve both responsiveness and strongly fair validity. Hence,
we define a weaker notion of fairness, called weakly fair valid-
ity, which captures the decided values when the BA protocol
is executed many times. When applying to blockchains, BA is
usually executed once for each block. Thus, weak fair validity
is a reasonable metric if we examine the distribution of the
proposers for a series of blocks. We will formally introduce
and justify the definition in Section III.
f) Our Contributions: To sum up, this paper has two
main contributions. First, we formalize the notion of fairness
and analyze the relevant properties, including:
• we define strongly fair validity, which states that every
honest node’s value has a reasonable probability of being
decided if the protocol is only executed once;
• we define weakly fair validity, which lower-bounds the
expected numbers that honest nodes’ values being de-
cided if the protocol is executed many times;
• we show that no BA protocol can achieve agreement,
termination and weakly fair validity at the same time in
an asynchronous network;
• we show that no BA protocol can achieve both respon-
siveness and strongly fair validity even in synchronous
network.
Second, we propose two partition-resilient BA protocols
tolerating up to 1/3 corruptions that achieve a different level of
fairness. The first protocol, called RBA, achieves strongly fair
validity, while the second protocol, called HBA, achieves both
3In this paper, fair validity and responsiveness in our protocols depend on
λ.
responsiveness and weakly fair validity. The two protocols
not only justify the definition of fair validity but are also
pragmatic and friendly for real-world implementation. If there
is no partition, HBA terminates in (4tmax + 6)λ in the worst
case, 8λ in the average case and 4δ in the best case, where tmax
is the number of malicious users and δ is the actual network
latency. In addition, only the pre-determined proposer needs to
propose the value, so the bandwidth complexity is low. Even
if the pre-determined proposer crashes, other users still can
reach an agreement by the followed RBA. In this aspect, our
protocol avoids the single point of failure and resists to the
DDoS attack.
Let n be the number of nodes joining the protocol and t
be the number of malicious nodes. Our work can be formally
summarized as the following theorems.
Theorem 2. Synchronous authenticated Byzantine agreement
can achieve partition-resilience, strongly fair validity and
optimal resilience t < n/3 with
• in the best case, 5 rounds termination and O(n2) com-
munication,
• expected 8 rounds termination and O(n2) communica-
tion,
• in the worst case, 4tmax + 6 rounds termination and
O(n2t) communication against an adaptive adversary.
Theorem 3. Synchronous authenticated Byzantine agreement
can achieve responsiveness, partition-resilience, weakly fair
validity and optimal resilience t < n/3 with
• in the best case, less than 4δ termination and O(n2)
communication,
• expected less than 6.33 rounds termination and O(n2)
communication,
• in the worst case, 4tmax + 9 rounds termination and
O(n2t) communication against a adaptive adversary.
The proof of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 are given in Section
IV and Section V, respectively.
B. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, only Abraham et al. [6]
discussed the fairness in the context of BA. In that paper,
they defined the quality of a BA: the probability of choosing
a value that was proposed by an honest node is at least 12
except with negligible probability.
Their definition [6] is not sufficient when the BA is applied
to blockchains. The quality views all the honest nodes as a
whole. There may be an honest node whose value is never
accepted by other nodes, which is undesired in blockchains.
On the contrary, both the strong and the weak fair validity in
this paper characterize the behavior of each honest node.
Algorand agreement [5] inspires us to design a synchronous
BA resisting to the network failure. In [5], they proposed a
partition-resilient BA with leader election based on verifiable
random functions. The main contribution of our protocol is
that HBA further achieves responsiveness while remaining
partition-resilience. Besides, a leader is elected for each itera-
tion in Algorand’s design. On the contrary, our leader election
procedure is independent of the iteration index, so the nodes
are not required to propose their values at each iteration. As a
result, Algorands BA only achieves probabilistic finality, while
RBA and HBA both terminate in f iterations in the worst case,
where f is the number of malicious nodes.
Therefore, without sacrificing security, HBA outdoes in the
aspect of performance. In the best case, HBA terminates as fast
as the actual network latency; in the worst case, HBA achieves
deterministic finality.
Another important related work is practical Byzantine fault
tolerance (PBFT) by Castro and Liskov [7]. The notion of
responsiveness is emerging in their work [7], but it is formally
defined in [4]. To achieve responsiveness, there is a specific
node, the primary, that can be predicted for each view. We
adopt the same method in HBA for the responsiveness.
When the primary does not follow the protocol, PBFT relies
on view change to switch to the next pre-determined primary.
However, the predictable primaries are easy to be attacked, like
DDoS. The attacker may compromise a series of primaries so
that the protocol may halt for a long time. On the contrary, in
HBA, when the primary4 is malicious and does not broadcast
the valid messages, the honest nodes will initiate RBA, whose
leader is selected by a verifiable random function. In this
case, the attacker cannot predict who will be the leader, so
the protocol terminates in the constant time in expectation.
Precisely, when RBA is initiated, all the honest terminate on
some values in 8λ.
Hybrid consensus [4] proposed by Pass and Shi is a re-
sponsive blockchain protocol, where the responsiveness relies
on the underlying Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocol.
Briefly speaking, the participants of the underlying BFT is
selected by the permissionless Nakamoto consensus since the
consistency of blockchain guarantees that every honest party
agrees on the same set of participants. Hence, HBA can also
be adopted as the underlying BFT.
C. Technical Overview of RBA and HBA
In this paper, we propose two BA protocols. Both of them
achieve partition-resilience and tolerate up to 1/3 corrup-
tions. The first protocol, robust Byzantine agreement (RBA),
achieves the strongly fair validity. The second protocol, hybrid
Byzantine agreement (HBA), achieves responsiveness and the
weakly fair validity. In the following paragraphs, we highlight
the insights on how these protocols achieve these properties.
For convenience, we set the threshold of a supermajority to
be 2t+1 out of total population 3t+1, where t is the number
of Byzantine nodes.
a) Agreement: RBA is a leader based protocol. The
leader is elected by the pseudorandom value of a verifiable
random function, which we called a credential. At the begin-
ning of RBA, each node proposes its value and the credential
for being a leader.
4The pre-determined node in HBA is called the pioneer. See Section V.
Then, each iteration consists of two phases of voting: In
the first phase voting, nodes identify the leader by comparing
their credential and vote on the leader’s value. If an honest
node receives a supermajority of votes for the same value, the
node locks the value. In the second phase voting5, the nodes
vote for the locked values.
If a node locks on some value, it will always vote for the
locked value in the following iterations, unless the locked
value is updated. A node only locks one value and updates
its locked value if it receives a supermajority of votes for the
same value in the first phase in the future iteration.
A node terminates if a supermajority of votes for the
same value in the second phase. This means that there is a
supermajority of nodes locks on the value.
b) Partition-Resilience: We design two mechanisms to
achieve this. First, at any time, at most one value can be locked
by a supermajority of nodes. Once the supermajority of node
locks on a value, all honest nodes in the supermajority will
only vote on the value for the first phase in the following
iterations. Then, it is impossible that a new value will be
locked. Hence, the honest nodes never decide on different
values even if the partition exists.
Second, to ensure node can process in the same iteration
even network partition sometimes happened, nodes will jump
to the newest iteration if it receives a majority of votes in the
first phase of that iteration. That is, each node will update
the locking value not only by the timing bound from the
synchronous network but also the condition of valid votes is
received asynchronously to against network partition.
c) Responsiveness: For HBA, the pre-determined leader
(we called pioneer) mechanism is adopted. Each node can
know who is the pioneer by some pre-determined information
before the protocol starts. In the first iteration of HBA, each
node votes the value proposed by the pioneer immediately.
If the pioneer is honest and the network operates normally,
all the nodes simply decide on pioneer’s value. Otherwise, if
no value is decided after the first iteration, every node starts
RBA with the initial state inherit from the first iteration.
Since the pioneer is pre-determined in the first iteration,
each node decides on pioneer’s value as soon as the votes in
the first and second phase are enough. In other words, the
nodes work asynchronously in the first iteration, and thus, the
latency only depends on the actual network instead of the
upper-bound. Note that, there are still two voting phases in
case of a network partition.
d) Fair Validity: In RBA, every node follows the leader’s
value, so we have to make sure every node has a reasonable
probability of being chosen as the leader for the strongly fair
validity. The leader is chosen by the credentials from each
node. Thus, nodes have to wait for the worst-case network
latency to ensure all the messages from honest nodes are
received.
On the other hand, in HBA, every node follows the pioneer’s
value to achieve the responsiveness, so other node’s value will
5In Section IV, we call the first phase voting pre-commit message and call
the second phase voting commit message.
not be decided if the pioneer and the network work normally.
Thus, HBA only achieve weakly fair validity. To do this, the
pioneer election is done by permutation. That is, there is a
deterministic list for the order of pioneers (e.g., ranking by
public key). Suppose there are n nodes joining the protocol.
In this case, the expected numbers that honest nodes’ values
being decided are roughly Mn after M times of the protocol.
e) Optimal Resilience: The famous results by Dwork et
al. [8] showed the impossibility of a permissioned consensus
protocol even with public key infrastructure cannot tolerate 1/3
or more Byzantine corruptions in an asynchronous network.
Conceptually, suppose n nodes are divided into three distinct
sets: S1, S2 and SB , where the nodes in S1 and S2 are honest
and the ndoes in SB are malicious. Due to the asynchronous
network, the messages between S1 and S2 are delayed arbi-
trarily long. Without loss of generality, we assume n = 3t+1
and |S1| = |S2| = t, |SB | = t+ 1. If the protocol only needs
2t nodes to proceed, the nodes in SB can send inconsistent
messages to S1 and S2. Then, the nodes in S1 and S2 may
agree on the different values, respectively, so the agreement
breaks. If the protocol needs more than 2t nodes to proceeds,
the nodes in SB just crash. Then, the protocol will halt forever
and the termination breaks.
Thus, once the malicious users are more than bn−13 c, either
the agreement or the termination breaks. To achieve partition-
resilience, both RBA and HBA tolerates 1/3 corruptions,
which is the optimal according to the argument above.
D. Roadmap
In Section II, we formalize our network and adversary
models. In Section III, we define strongly fair validity and
weakly fair validity, and we also give two relevant impos-
sibility results. Then, the protocol and the security analysis
of RBA and HBA are given in Section IV and Section V,
respectively. We analyze the communication complexity of
RBA and HBA in Section D. We implemented our protocols
by Go language and deployed on Google Cloud Platform
services. The experiment results are presented in Section VI.
We also compare the performance of HBA and three other BA
protocols under different network conditions by simulation in
Section VII. Finally, the main contributions are concluded in
Section VIII. The proofs in Section IV and Section V are given
in Appendix B and Appendix C, respectively.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. System Model
In this paper, we consider the authenticated setting (i.e.,
digital signature and public key infrastructure (PKI) exist).
We further assume that when the users register their public
keys on the PKI, they cannot choose the key in favor of other
users’ keys. In practice, this can be done by commit-and-reveal
schemes. The users register the hash values of their public keys
on the PKI first. After all the users have registered, they reveal
the public keys.
We say the adversary is static if the adversary has to choose
which nodes are corrupted before the protocol starts. On the
contrary, we say the adversary is adaptive if the adversary can
choose which nodes are corrupted during the protocol. The
corrupted nodes are called Byzantine and the nodes that are
not corrupted are called honest. A Byzantine node can deviate
from the protocol arbitrarily; it can engage in problematic
malfunctions such as sending conflicting messages, violating
algorithm criteria, delaying the messages between other nodes,
and so on. We also assume the adversary has full control of the
network. The adversary can learn all the messages delivered
on the network and determine the delay and the order of the
delivered messages.
We say a network is synchronous if there exists a known
time bound λ. We say the network is partitioned if the
messages between the honest nodes are delayed such that
the delivering time exceeds λ. A network is recovered from
partition if all nodes receive all the previous messages which
should be delivered and the delay of the message is lower than
λ. We say a network is asynchronous if time bound doesn’t
exist.
B. Terminology
Let X be a random variable. The expectation value of X is
denoted as E[X].
A function f is negligible if for all polynomial p, there
exists an integer N such that for all integers n > N , it holds
that f(n) < 1p(n) .
Given a security parameter κ, a protocol P0 and a pro-
tocol P1, we say P0 is indistinguishable from P1, if for
all polynomial-time distinguishers D, there is a negligible
function f such that
Pr
b←{0,1}
[b = b′|D operates in Pb(κ) and D outputs b′] ≤ f(κ).
C. Verifiable Random Function
The verifiable random function (VRF), introduced by Mi-
cali, Rabin and Vadhan [9], is a type of pseudorandom function
by which anyone can verify the validity of the function
evaluation from public information. The formal definition is
given in Appendix A.
III. FAIRNESS
A. Definition
Let κ be the security parameter and n be the number of
total nodes joining Byzantine agreements, where each node
qi starts with the initial value vi. Let H be the set of honest
nodes at the end of the Byzantine agreement.
Definition 4 (strongly fair validity). A Byzantine agreement
achieves strongly fair validity for a set of adversaries A if for
all adversaries in A, there exists a negligible function negl
such that for all qi ∈ H, it holds that
Pr[vi is the decided by some honest node] ≥ 1
n
− negl(κ).
(1)
In practice, if we apply the Byzantine agreement to
blockchains, the Byzantine agreement may be executed many
times, once for each block. Hence, we propose a weaker
version of fairness, called weakly fair validity. Intuitively,
it guarantees the lower-bound of the expected numbers that
honest nodes values being decided if the protocol is executed
many times.
Definition 5 (weakly fair validity). Suppose we execute a
Byzantine agreement M times. Let Xij be a binary random
variable such that Xij = 1 if qi’s initial value is decided by
some honest node in j-th time; otherwise, Xij = 0. LetHM be
the set of honest nodes when the Byzantine agreement has to
be executed M times. Then, we say the Byzantine agreement
achieves weakly fair validity for a set of adversaries A if, for
all adversaries in A, there exists a negligible function negl
such that for all qi ∈ HM , it holds that
E[Xi] ≥ bM
n
c − negl(κ), (2)
where Xi =
∑M
j=1Xij .
Obviously, a BA with strongly fair validity must be a BA
with weakly fair validity.
B. Impossibility of fair Byzantine agreements
In this section, we prove two impossibilities of fair Byzan-
tine agreements.
Theorem 6. In an asynchronous network, no Byzantine agree-
ment tolerating some Byzantine nodes can achieve agreement,
termination and weakly fair validity at the same time.
Proof. Let n be the number of total nodes joining Byzantine
agreements. We divide n nodes into two sets: n − 1 nodes
in the first set S1 and one node in the second set S2. Due
to the asynchronous network, the delay between two sets can
be arbitrarily long while the messages delivered in the same
set arrive immediately. In this case, the nodes in S1 cannot
distinguish whether the node in S2 is Byzantine or the network
is partitioned. If the nodes in S1 wait for the messages from
S2, the termination fails because the node in S2 may be
Byzantine. If the nodes in S1 do not wait for the messages
from S2, the weakly fair validity fails because the initial value
of the node in S2 will not be considered in the protocol.
Theorem 6 rules out the possibility that constructing an
asynchronous Byzantine agreement to achieve fairness. That
is why we construct RBA in section IV to achieve fairness.
Since the latency of typical synchronous Byzantine agree-
ments is a multiple of the worst-case bound of network latency.
The latency of fair Byzantine agreements is also bounded by
the worst-case network latency. Can we construct a responsive
Byzantine agreement that achieves fairness? We prove the
impossibility of this question in next theorem.
Theorem 7. Responsive synchronous Byzantine agreements
cannot achieve strongly fair validity.
Proof. We prove this theorem by contradiction. Assume a re-
sponsive synchronous Byzantine agreement achieves strongly
fair validity. Let u be an honest node in the responsive
synchronous Byzantine agreement and the latency of message
sent from u to other nodes be always in (λ − , λ), where
 is an arbitrary positive number less than λ. If the decided
time be in (0, λ − ), the message of the honest node u has
zero probability of being decided by the responsive Byzantine
agreement. This violates the definition of strongly fair validity.
Otherwise, the decided time is larger than λ− . This violates
the definition of responsiveness.
Thus, we construct a responsive Byzantine agreement
HBA to achieve weakly fair in section V as an example that a
responsive Byzantine agreement can achieve weakly fairness.
IV. ROBUST BYZANTINE AGREEMENT
In this section, we introduce our first Byzantine agreement
protocol with partition-resilience, strongly fair validity tol-
erating up to 1/3 corruptions. We call the protocol robust
Byzantine agreement (RBA).
A. Protocol
Let S be the set of all nodes and n be the size of S. Let
tmax = b(n − 1)/3c and V denote the set of values that can
be decided. We also define two special values ⊥ and SKIP
that are not in V . For each node q ∈ S, q has four internal
variables: rq records the index of the iteration at which q
is working, lockvalueq records the candidate value that q
supports, lockiteq records the index of the iteration from which
lockvalueq comes and clockq is q’s local clock. Let skq and
pkq denote the secret key and public key of q, respectively.
Let F be a verifiable random function (VRF). We write
〈y, pi〉 ← Fsk(m)
to denote the output of F on the message m with the secret key
sk, where y is the pseudorandom value and pi is the proof for y.
We define status to be the pre-determined public information,
for example, the public key of all nodes in BA or the height
of blocks in blockchain.
a) Message types: We define three kinds of messages:
1) the initial message of the node q: (“init”, vq, q, 〈yq, piq〉),
where 〈yq, piq〉 ← Fskq (status)
2) the pre-commit message of the value v from the node q
at the iteration r: (“pre-com”, v, q, r)
3) the commit message of the value v from the node q at
the iteration r: (“com”, v, q, r)
We assume all messages are protected by the digital signature,
so the authentication of the messages hold.
b) Leader election: With these notations, we introduce
the leader election algorithm which will be a subroutine of
RBA. Let Mq denote the set of initial messages that the node
q receives from all the nodes (including q itself). The node q
verifies the VRF value 〈yj , pij〉 in Mq and sets Uq to be the
set of nodes whose VRF values are valid. Then, q computes
`q = argmin
j∈Uq
yj .
We say `q is the leader of q.
c) Updating internal variables: Suppose a node q is
working at iteration rq . The node q updates its internal
variables as soon as one of the following conditions holds:
1) (lock condition) If node q has seen 2tmax+1 pre-commit
messages of the same value v ∈ V ∪ {⊥} at the same
iteration r such that r = rq , q sets lockvalueq = v and
lockiteq = r.
2) (forward condition) If node q has seen 2tmax + 1 pre-
commit messages of the same value v ∈ V ∪{⊥} at the
same iteration r such that r > rq , q sets clockq = 2λ
and starts the iteration r from Step 2.
3) (forward condition) If the node q has seen 2tmax + 1
commit messages of any value at the same iteration r
such that r ≥ rq , q sets clockq = 2λ and starts the
iteration r + 1 from Step 2.
We say that node q achieves the lock condition, if the condition
1 holds. We say that node q achieves the forward condition if
the condition 2 or the condition 3 holds. Node q goes into the
next iteration immediately if it achieves the forward condition
even if it does not achieve the forward condition at Step 4.
d) Protocol description: RBA (Algorithm 1) is an
iteration-based protocol. Initially, for all honest nodes q ∈ S,
q initializes its internal variables by rq = 1, lockvalueq =
SKIP, lockiteq = −1 and clockq = 0 and also chooses its
initial value vq ∈ V .
Our protocol has four steps in each iteration. At Step 1, all
the nodes broadcast their own initial value vq in the format
(“init”, vq, q, 〈yq, piq〉).
When clockq = 2λ, q enters Step 2. If lockvalueq ∈
{SKIP,⊥}, q verifies the initial messages it receives and
computes the set Uq of nodes whose VRF values are valid.
If Uq 6= ∅, q identifies its leader `q and pre-commits
`q’s value; otherwise, q pre-commits ⊥. If lockvalueq 6∈
{SKIP,⊥}, node q pre-commits lockvalueq . We say node q
pre-commits on a value v if node q broadcasts the message
(“pre-com”, v, q, r) where r is the iteration index that node
q is working at. Note that node q updates its lockvalueq and
lockiteq immediately if the lock condition holds.
When clockq = 4λ, node q enters Step 3. Node q commits
on its current lockvalueq . We say node q commits on a value
v if node q broadcasts the message (“com”, v, q, r) where r is
the iteration index that q is working at. After node q broadcasts
the commit message, q enters Step 4, at which q waits for the
forward conditions.
e) Termination condition: Node q decides on a value v
as soon as node q has seen 2tmax +1 commit messages of the
same value v ∈ V ∪ {⊥} at the same iteration r.
The protocol for a node q is summarized as Algorithm 1.
B. Agreement
We first show that our protocol will reach agreement; that
is, two honest nodes never decide on the different values.
Lemma 8. Assume t ≤ tmax. Suppose a node p receives
2tmax +1 commit messages of vp and another node q receives
Input : an initial value vq ∈ V from node q and the
public key {pkq} from all nodes
Output : an agreed value vfin ∈ V ∪ {⊥} from some
node
Initialize rq = 1, lockvalueq = SKIP, lockiteq = −1 and
clockq = 0
Step 1: when clockq = 0,
broadcast(“init”, vq, q, 〈yq, piq〉)
Step 2: when clockq = 2λ,
if lockvalueq ∈ {SKIP,⊥} and Uq 6= ∅ then
node q identifies its leader `q at q’s current view
broadcast(“pre-com”, v`q , q, rq)
else if lockvalueq ∈ {SKIP,⊥} and Uq = ∅ then
broadcast(“pre-com”,⊥, q, rq)
else
broadcast(“pre-com”, lockvalueq, q, rq)
Step 3: when clockq = 4λ,
broadcast(“com”, lockvalueq, q, rq)
Step 4: when clockq ∈ (4λ,∞)
wait until the forward condition is achieved
Algorithm 1: Robust Byzantine Agreement for node q
2tmax+1 commit messages of vq . If both these 2tmax+1 commit
messages all come from the iteration r, then vp = vq .
Theorem 9 (Agreement). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary
is adaptive. Regardless of partition, if an honest node p decides
on some value vp and another honest node q decides on some
value vq , then vp = vq . That is, the honest nodes will never
decide on different values.
C. Termination
We now analyze when the algorithm terminates if no parti-
tion exists or if the system recovers from a previous partition
in different adversary model.
Proposition 10 (Termination without partition in adaptive
adversary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive.
If all the honest nodes start at the r-th iteration within time
λ and no partition exists, all the honest nodes will decide on
some values in t+ 1 iterations.
Note that the honest nodes will broadcast commit messages
when clockq = 4λ. If all the honest nodes start RBA simul-
taneously, they will all receive the commit messages when
clockq = 5λ. However, we allow that any two honest nodes
start the protocol with at most λ time difference. Thus, the
node who start the protocol earliest will receive the commit
messages when its local time clockq = 6λ. That is, the best
termination time of RBA is 6λ.
As we shown in Proposition 10, all the honest nodes will
terminate in t + 1 iterations with certainty. According to
the forward conditions, nodes start the r-th iteration from
clockq = 2λ for all r ≥ 2. Hence, the first iteration costs
6λ to complete, but the following iterations only cost 4λ for
each. Thus, the t + 1 iterations cost (4t + 6)λ in the worst
case.
Proposition 11 (Expected termination in static adversary).
Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is static. Suppose all honest
nodes start at r-th iteration within time λ and no partition
exists. Then, it is expected that all honest nodes will decide
on some values in 8 rounds.
Proposition 12 (Fast recovery from partition in adaptive
adversary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive. If
the partition is resolved, all the honest nodes will decide on
some values in t+2 iteration. If the adversary is static, it is to
be expected that all honest nodes will decide on some values
in 12 rounds.
D. Strongly Fair Validity
In this section, we prove that RBA achieves strongly fair
validity. Intuitively, when the network operates synchronously,
every honest nodes receives all the initial messages from each
other before 2λ. Then, as long as the underlying VRF is secure,
the probability of being the leader is approximate the uniform
distribution, so RBA achieves strongly fair validity. The result
is formalized as the following theorem.
Theorem 13 (strongly fair validity). Suppose the network is
synchronous and F is a secure VRF. Then, RBA achieves
strongly fair validity under the assumption of static adversary.
V. HYBRID BYZANTINE AGREEMENT
In the previous section, the leader is selected by the low-
est value of VRF in RBA. This limits the performance of
RBA since nodes have to wait for the worst-case network
latency to ensure all the messages from honest nodes are re-
ceived. In this section, we improve the efficiency by hybridiz-
ing of RBA and the pre-determined leader method. Intuitively,
our protocol consists of two phases. At the beginning of the
protocol, all the nodes can uniquely identify a particular node,
called pioneer, in a deterministic way. In the first phase, the
pioneer broadcast its value and other nodes pre-commit on
pioneer’s value as soon as possible. If the pioneer does not
propose a value, other nodes start RBA, if timeouts.
Due to the hybrid structure, we call the improved BA in
this section hybrid Byzantine agreement (HBA). Note that,
since there is only one pioneer, each node can decide when
enough votes are received instead of waiting for the worst-case
network latency. Thus, this technique achieves responsiveness.
A. Protocol
Now we formally introduce HBA(p) protocol, where p is the
parameter related to the pioneer election in following part.
a) Message types: Except for initial message, pre-
commit message and commit message, we need the fourth
type of message in HBA:
4. the fast message of the pioneer node q: (“fast”, vq)
b) Pioneer election: Let ui be the ith node by sorting
all the user according to their public key. The pioneer is node
up, where p is the parameter of HBA protocol.
c) Leader election: The leader election of HBA is the
same as RBA.
d) Updating internal variables: The conditions for up-
dating internal variables in HBA are almost the same in RBA,
except that the forward conditions start the next iteration from
Step 4 and clockq = 5λ. Suppose a node q is working at
iteration rq . The node q updates its internal variables as soon
as one of the following conditions holds:
1) (lock condition) If node q has seen 2tmax+1 pre-commit
messages of the same value v ∈ V ∪ {⊥} at the same
iteration r such that r = rq , q sets lockvalueq = v and
lockiteq = r.
2) (forward condition) If node q has seen 2tmax + 1 pre-
commit messages of the same value v ∈ V ∪{⊥} at the
same iteration r such that r > rq , q sets clockq = 5λ
and starts the iteration r from Step 4.
3) (forward condition) If the node q has seen 2tmax + 1
commit messages of any value at the same iteration r
such that r ≥ rq , q sets clockq = 5λ and starts the
iteration r + 1 from Step 4.
e) Protocol description: Before Step 1, the pioneer can
be uniquely determined by all the nodes according to the
pioneer election.
At Step 1, the pioneer broadcast its own initial value in
the format (“fast”, vq). For every non-pioneer node q, q
starts HBA from Step 2. At Step 2, the pioneer broadcasts
the pre-commit message of its value. For every node q,
when q receives pioneer’s fast message, q broadcasts the pre-
commit message (“pre-com”, vleader, q,∞) immediately if
clockq ≤ 3λ.
For every node q, if q receives 2tmax + 1 pre-commit
messages of the same value v ∈ V and clockq ≤ 3λ, q updates
the variables lockvalueq = v and lockiteq = 0 (according
to the lock condition) and broadcasts the commit message
broadcast(“com”, lockvalueq, q,∞) immediately. Note that
the honest nodes broadcast the pre-commit and commit mes-
sages as soon as the conditions are satisfied. It is the core idea
to achieve the responsiveness.
Step 3 to Step 6 is a RBA protocol, except that the internal
variables lockvalueq and lockiteq may be changed in Step 2.
f) Termination condition: The termination condition in
HBA is the same as RBA: Node q decides on a value v as
soon as node q has seen 2tmax + 1 commit messages of the
same value v ∈ V ∪ {⊥} at the same iteration r.
The protocol for a node q is summarized as Algorithm 2.
B. Agreement
Theorem 14 (Agreement of HBA). Assume t ≤ tmax and the
adversary is adaptive. Regardless of partition, if an honest
node p decides on some value vp and another honest node q
decides on some value vq , then vp = vq . That is, the honest
nodes will never decide on different values.
C. Termination
Proposition 15 (Termination without partition in static adver-
sary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is static. If all the
honest nodes start HBA within time λ and no partition exists,
all the honest nodes will decide on some values in 4λ, 6.33λ
Parameter: a pioneer number p
Input : an initial value vq ∈ V from node q who has
own secret key skq and the public key
{pki}i from all nodes, and public
randomness and information
Output : an agreed value vfin ∈ V ∪ {⊥} from some
node
Initialize rq = 0, lockvalueq = SKIP, lockiteq = −1 and
clockq = 0
Identify the pioneer
Step 1: when clockq = 0,
if node q is the pioneer then
broadcast(“fast”, vq)
Step 2: when clockq ≤ 3λ,
if receiving pioneer’s value vpioneer or node q is the
pioneer, then
check then broadcast(“pre-com”, vpioneer, q, 0)
if node q sees 2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages of the
same value v ∈ V then
broadcast(“com”, lockvalueq, q, 0)
Step 3: when clockq = 3λ,
broadcast(“init”, vq, q, 〈yq, piq〉)
set rq = 1
Step 4: when clockq = 5λ,
if lockvalueq ∈ {SKIP,⊥} and Uq 6= ∅ then
node q identifies its leader `q at q’s current view
broadcast(“pre-com”, v`q , q, rq)
else if lockvalueq ∈ {SKIP,⊥} and Uq = ∅ then
broadcast(“pre-com”,⊥, q, rq)
else
broadcast(“pre-com”, lockvalueq, q, rq)
Step 5: when clockq = 7λ,
broadcast(“com”, lockvalueq, q, rq)
Step 6: when clockq ∈ (7λ,∞)
wait until the forward condition is achieved
Algorithm 2: Hybrid Byzantine Agreement for node q
and t+1 iterations in the best case, the average case and the
worst case, respectively.
Proposition 16 (Termination without partition in adaptive
adversary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive. If
all the honest nodes start HBA within time λ and no partition
exists, all the honest nodes will decide on some values in t+1
iterations.
Proposition 17 (Fast recovery from a partition in adaptive
adversary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive. If
the partition is resolved, all the honest nodes will decide on
some values in t + 2 iterations. If the adversary is static, it
is to be expected that all honest nodes will decide on some
values in 12 rounds.
D. Responsiveness
The following proposition directly implies that HBA is
responsive.
Proposition 18. Assume the actual network delay is δ, and
all the nodes start HBA within τ time difference. If there is
no partition and the pioneer is honest, all the honest nodes
will decide on some values in τ + 3δ.
E. Weakly Fair Validity
Theorem 19 (weakly fair validity). Suppose the network is
synchronous. Then, HBA achieves weakly fair validity under
the assumption of static adversary.
VI. EXPERIMENT
We implemented our protocol by Go language and deployed
on Google Cloud Platform services. We ran RBA and
HBA on 21 GCP instances (4 vCPU and 8GB RAM)
uniformly distributed throughout its 10 regions spanning 3
continents.
We set λ = 0.5 second by the reason of our experiment on
the latency on GCP. However, it is optimistic to set this bound
for a general network. For RBA , the experiment repeats 703
times and the histogram is shown in Figure. 1. The average
latency of RBA is 3.20 seconds and the standard deviation is
87.60 ms. The results show the latency of RBA is expected
6.4 round, which is close to the round complexity of the best
case.
Fig. 1: The histogram of latency of RBA.
For HBA , the experiment repeats 715 times and the
histogram is shown in Figure. 2. This result confirms the
responsiveness of HBA . The average latency of HBA is
241.79 ms and the standard deviation is 83.06 ms.
Fig. 2: The histogram of latency of HBA.
VII. SIMULATION
To demonstrate the performance, responsiveness, and
partition-resilience of HBA, we implement three other Byzan-
tine agreements and compare the simulation results. The three
protocols are PBFT [7], the synchronous BA proposed by
Abraham et al. (ADD+19) [10] (the version against static
adversary), and Algorand agreement [5].
Let n be the number of nodes, f be the number of maximum
faulty nodes, and λ be the predefined maximum network delay
for the protocols. We implement a network module that each
node connected to. The actual network delay is parametrized
by G(µ, σ) where the delay is sampled from a Gaussian
distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ.
The number of messages sent and the latency during a
Byzantine agreement process is recorded from the first mes-
sage sent to the last node decides its value. Note that we do not
have any faulty node in this experiment. We run the experiment
on a MacBook Pro with 2.6GHz 6-core Intel Core i7, but
the latency is calculated by a simulation clock instead of a
wall clock or CPU time, so the result should be able to be
reproduced on any machine specification. Means and standard
deviations from each result are calculated from 100 times of
simulation.
We conduct two experiments to show the behaviors of
different protocols under different network conditions.
a) Responsiveness: In the first experiment, all the net-
work delays are sampled from G(250ms, 50ms). We execute
the four protocols under different λ (400ms, 1000ms, 2000ms)
and the result is shown in Figure 3.
From Figure 3, we can see that the confirmation time
of BAs with responsiveness such as HBA and PBFT only
depend on the actual network latency. Thus, the confirmation
time does not change when λ varies. On the other hand, the
confirmation time of synchronous BA without responsiveness
such as ADD+19 and Algorand agreement increases as λ
increases. The ratio between confirmation time and λ is the
number of total rounds. It costs around 6.2 rounds and 2.2
rounds for ADD+19 and Algorand agreement, respectively.
b) Partition-Resilience: In the second experiment, the
network operates in two modes: the normal mode and the
partition mode. In the normal mode, all the nodes are con-
nected with the delay sampled from G(250ms, 50ms). In the
partition mode, the network is divided into three distinct sets
of size bn3 c or bn3 c + 1. Within the set, the delay is sampled
from G(250ms, 50ms). For the messages between two sets,
the delays are sampled from G(4000ms, 1000ms). All the
protocols are executed with λ = 1000ms. Thus, when the
network is in the partition mode, the delay between different
sets exceeds λ. The protocols are executed in the partition
mode for 60 seconds. Then, the network becomes the normal
mode. The result is shown in Figure 4.
Notice that the partition is “benign” in this model. Except
that the delays are sampled from G(4000ms, 1000ms), there
is no adversary that re-schedules or delay the messages to
break the protocols maliciously. The benign partition captures
the case that the Internet cables breaks so that the alternative
route is saturated.
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Fig. 4: Bandwidth cost and confirmation time of each Byzan-
tine Agreement in partitioned network, where bar chart (left-
side) shows the number of message and scatter diagram (right-
side) shows the confirm time
In this experiment, the agreement holds for all the protocols.
From Figure 4, we can see that all four protocols terminate
successfully. In particular, HBA and PBFT terminates before
the network is recovered (at 60 seconds).
Concretely speaking, when running HBA, the honest node
q updates lockvalueq when it receives 2tmax + 1 pre-commit
messages at the current iteration. In other words, as long as
the lock condition is triggered before the forward condition,
the honest node q will update lockvalueq and broadcast the
commit message of lockvalueq in the next iteration. Then,
honest nodes terminate when they receive 2tmax + 1 commit
messages.
In order to prevent honest nodes from termination by
delaying messages, the adversary needs to trigger the forward
condition before the lock condition. However, such condition
rarely happens in practice if the network is not manipulated
maliciously.
As for PBFT, the timeout scales up when the view change
happens, so once the timeout exceeds the delay, the protocol
terminates. For ADD+19, the protocol is design for the syn-
chronous network, and the partition-resilience is not claimed
in their paper, but the protocol terminates after the partition
is resolved 6. As Algorand claimed, the protocol terminates
immediately after the network is recovered.
c) Bandwidth Usage: Finally, we give a short remark to
the bandwidth usages. The numbers of messages are highly
related to bandwidth usages. From Figure 4, the numbers
of messages are similar for HBA and PBFT under different
participating nodes. The numbers of messages of ADD+19 and
Algorand are more than 69% and 330% larger than HBA for
any setting, respectively.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we figure out what counts a suitable BA for
blockchains and give the concrete constructions that achieve
the properties. We discuss three desired properties from the
aspects of incentive model, security and performance. The first
property is fair validity, and we prove two impossibilities: any
BA cannot achieve weakly fair validity in the asynchronous
network, and any responsive BA cannot achieve strongly fair
validity. The second property is partition-resilience because
the real-world internet is sometimes unstable or attacked
by adversaries. The third property is responsiveness because
the latency is usually limited by the time bounds of the
synchronous BAs.
We also give two constructions, RBA and HBA, to demon-
strate these properties. The first protocol, RBA, achieves
strongly fair validity and partition-resilience. Based on RBA,
the second protocol, HBA, achieves weakly fair validity,
partition-resilience, and responsiveness. Moreover, comparing
to PBFT, HBA enjoys a better resistance to DDoS and bet-
ter latency in the network partition. With these properties,
HBA strikes a balance between fairness, security, and perfor-
mance.
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APPENDIX A
DEFINITION OF VRF
The definition is paraphrased from [9].
Definition 20 (verifiable random function). Let
(KeyGen,Prove,Veri) be a 3-tuple polynomial-time
algorithm, where
1) KeyGen takes as input a security parameter κ and
outputs a pair of key (pk, sk).
2) Prove takes as input a seed x and a secret key sk; it
outputs a value Fsk(x) and a proof pisk(x).
3) Veri takes as input (pk, x, y, pi); it verifies whether y =
Fsk(x) by using the proof pi and key pk.
Let a : N → N ∪ {∗} and a : N → N be any functions such
that a(κ) and b(κ) are computable in time poly(κ). We say
(KeyGen,Prove,Veri) is a verifiable random function with
input length a(κ) and output length b(κ) if the following
properties hold:
1) Correctness. If (y, pi) = Prove(sk, x), then
Pr[Veri(pk, x, y, pi) = yes] ≥ 1− negl(κ).
2) Uniqueness. For every (pk, x, y1, y2, pi1, pi2) such that
y1 6= y2, the following holds for either i = 1 or i = 2:
Pr[Veri(pk, x, yi, pii) = yes] ≤ negl(κ).
3) Pseudorandomness. (Sketched) Any probabilistic poly-
nomial time adversary cannot distinguish the output of
a VRF from a uniform random variable.
Intuitively, pseudorandomness requires that the output of a
VRF should be indistinguishable from a string sampled from
a uniform distribution.
APPENDIX B
PROOF IN RBA
A. Agreement
Lemma. Assume t ≤ tmax. Suppose a node p receives 2tmax+1
commit messages of vp and another node q receives 2tmax +1
commit messages of vq . If both these 2tmax + 1 commit
messages all come from the iteration r, then vp = vq .
Proof of lemma 8. We prove this lemma by contradiction.
Suppose vp 6= vq . Because as many as tmax Byzantine nodes
exist, there exists at least one honest node that both commits
on vp and vq by the pigeonhole principle. However, honest
nodes can only commit on one value at one iteration, which
leads to a contradiction.
Theorem (Agreement). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is
adaptive. Regardless of partition, if an honest node p decides
on some value vp and another honest node q decides on some
value vq , then vp = vq . That is, the honest nodes will never
decide on different values.
Proof of theorem 9. Because p decides on vp and q decides
on vq , p and q must see 2tmax + 1 commit messages of vp
and 2tmax + 1 commit messages of vq , respectively. Suppose
both these 2tmax + 1 commit messages come from the same
iteration r. By Lemma 8, we have vp = vq .
Suppose the 2tmax+1 commit messages that p receives come
from the iteration rp and the 2tmax+1 commit messages that q
receives come from the iteration rq . Without loss of generality,
we assume rp < rq . Because there are up to tmax Byzantine
nodes, there must be at least tmax + 1 honest nodes commit
on vp so that p can receive 2tmax + 1 commit messages of
vp. For all iterations r > rp, these tmax + 1 honest nodes will
always pre-commit on vp until they see 2tmax +1 pre-commit
messages of v′ 6= vp. However, only 2tmax nodes remain, so
these tmax+1 honest nodes will never pre-commit any v′ 6= vp
for all r > rp. Thus, for all r > rp, if some value v has
2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages, then v = vp.
Because q receives 2tmax +1 commit messages of vq , there
must exist at least tmax + 1 honest nodes that commit on vq
at the iteration rq . These tmax +1 honest nodes commit on vq
only if they have seen 2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages of vq
at iteration rq . Therefore, vq = vp.
B. Termination
Proposition (Termination without partition in adaptive adver-
sary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive. If all
the honest nodes start at the r-th iteration within time λ and
no partition exists, all the honest nodes will decide on some
values in t+ 1 iterations.
Proof of proposition 10. In this proof, we divide all the pos-
sibilities into three cases. First, we suppose there is an honest
node has decided on some value. Second, we suppose that no
honest node has decided, but there exists an honest node has
seen 2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages of the same value. The
third case includes all the else possibilities.
Case 1: Some honest node has decided. If an honest node p has
decided on the value vp, p must have seen 2tmax + 1 commit
messages of vp. Because p propagates these 2tmax +1 commit
messages, all the honest nodes will hold this information after
time λ and decide on vp in one iteration.
Case 2: Some honest node has seen 2tmax + 1 pre-commit
messages on the same value. Suppose no node has decided
but there exists an honest node p that has seen 2tmax + 1 pre-
commit messages of a value vp. Because p propagates these
2tmax+1 pre-commit messages, all the honest nodes will hold
this information after time λ. With these 2tmax+1 pre-commit
messages, all the honest nodes update their internal variables
lockvalueq = vp according to the condition 1. Consequently,
all the honest nodes will pre-commit on vp at the next iteration
and thus commit on vp as well. At the end of the next iteration,
they will all decide on vp.
Case 3: Else possibilities. Because no honest node has ever
seen 2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages, lockvalueq = ⊥ for all
honest node q. Thus, they will identify their leader by their
local view. Because all honest nodes start at the r-th iteration
within time λ, they can receive all the initial values from other
honest nodes before identifying the leaders. Thus, there exist
some honest nodes that pre-commit different values relative to
each other only if a Byzantine node proposes different initial
values to different nodes7. However, the honest nodes will
propagate the initial value so all honest nodes will have the
same set of initial values after time λ. Thus, to prevent the
honest nodes from agreeing on the same leader, Byzantine
nodes must propose different initial values to different nodes
at every iteration. However, a node can only propose an initial
value once, or it will be caught. Thus, the best strategy of
Byzantine nodes is that different Byzantine nodes propose their
initial values at different iterations so t Byzantine nodes can
only interfere during t iterations. Thus, all the honest nodes
will decide on some values in t + 1 iterations with certainty.
Proposition (Expected termination in static adversary). As-
sume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is static. Suppose all honest
nodes start at r-th iteration within time λ and no partition
exists. Then, it is expected that all honest nodes will decide
on some values in 8 rounds.
Proof of proposition 11. From the proof of Proposition 10, we
know that if some honest node has decided on value v or has
seen 2tmax +1 pre-commit messages of a value v, then all the
honest nodes will decide on v in one iteration.
In a network without partition, the best strategy for the
Byzantine nodes has been described in Case 3 in the proof
of Proposition 10. However, to interfere with k iterations
successfully, the Byzantine nodes must win the leadership in
the following k iterations. The probability of such an event is
k−1∏
i=0
(
t− i
n− i
)
(
n− t
n
) ≤
(
t
n
)k
(
n− t
n
).
Thus, in expectation, the number of rounds can be computed
by
t∑
i=0
(
t
n
)i
(
n− t
n
) · (6 + 4i) ≤ 6 + 4 ·
t
n
(1− tn )
.
Because n ≥ 3tmax + 1 ≥ 3t + 1, the expected number of
rounds is 8.
7Note that not proposing any initial value is considered to be equivalent to
proposing ⊥.
Proposition (Fast recovery from partition in adaptive adver-
sary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive. If the
partition is resolved, all the honest nodes will decide on some
values in t+ 2 iteration. If the adversary is static, it is to be
expected that all honest nodes will decide on some values in
12 rounds.
Proof of proposition 12. If there exists a node p that has
decided on a value vp, p must have seen 2tmax + 1 commit
messages of vp. All the honest nodes will receive these
2tmax + 1 commit messages of vp within time λ after the
partition is resolved and decide on vp.
Suppose no node has decided and p is the node working on
the latest iteration rp. To enter the iteration rp, p must achieve
the forward condition at iteration rp−1. Because the partition
is resolved, all honest nodes will also achieve the forward
condition within time λ after the partition is resolved and also
enter the iteration rp. Later on, if some node q achieves the
forward condition and enters the iteration rp+1, other honest
nodes will also achieve the forward condition within time λ.
Thus, all honest nodes start at the iteration rp + 1 with time
difference < λ and Proposition 10 guarantees that they will
decide on some values within the following t+ 1 iterations.
Because each iteration costs 4λ, similarly, if the adversary is
static, it is to be expected that all honest nodes will decide on
some values in 8+ 4 rounds according to Proposition 11.
C. Strongly Fair Validity
We first show that the probability is exactly lower-bounded
by the uniform distribution in the ideal world. Then, we
show that RBA works the same as the ideal world except
the negligible probability.
We define the VRF oracle, consisting of two algorithm:
Oprove and Overi. Oprove is defined as:
1) Take as input a seed x and a secret key sk.
2) Return Prove(x, sk).
Overi is defined as:
1) Take as input a public key pk, a seed x, a value y and
a proof pi.
2) Return Veri(pk, x, y, pi).
We also define the ideal functionality of VRF, consisting of
two algorithm: Iprove and Iveri. Iprove is defined as:
1) Takes as input a seed x and a secret key sk.
2) Check whether Q(x, sk) is defined. If not, choose y ←
{0, 1}` and pi ← {0, 1}` uniformly at random. Then, set
Q(x, sk) = (y, pi). If Q(x, sk) is defined, Iprove(x, sk)
return Q(x, sk).
Iveri is defined as:
1) Takes as input a public key pk, a seed x, a value y and
a proof pi.
2) Check whether Q(x, sk) is defined. If not, return false;
otherwise, return true.
In the ideal world, all the nodes does not compute and verify
the value of VRF locally. Instead, they query the oracle Iprove
and Iveri. All the else operations are the same as RBA.
Lemma 21 (fairness in the ideal world). Suppose the network
is synchronous. Then, in the ideal world, for all adversaries
and for all q ∈ H, conditioned on all the honest nodes have
decided on some values, it holds that
Pr[q’s value is the decided by some honest node] ≥ 1
n
. (3)
Proof of lemma 21. Because the VRF value yi are chosen
uniformly at random for all nodes i in the ideal world, the
probability that the node q wins the minimum value among
mini∈{1,··· ,n} yi (the leadership) is exact 1n .
Once the node q wins the leadership, all the honest nodes
will broadcast the pre-commit messages on vq at 2λ and
broadcast the commit messages on vq at 4λ because the
network is synchronous. In this case, q’s value will be decided
by all hones nodes.
Theorem (strongly fair validity). Suppose the network is
synchronous and F is a secure VRF. Then, RBA achieves
strongly fair validity under the assumption of static adversary.
Proof of theorem 13. We prove it by the hybrid argument. Let
Hyb1 be the protocol the same as the ideal world except that
the node q1 queries Oprove and Overi instead of Iprove and Iveri,
respectively. Then, for all i ∈ {2, · · · , n}, let Hybi be the
protocol the same as Hybi−1 except that the node qi queries
Oprove and Overi instead of Iprove and Iveri, respectively.
Because F is a secure VRF, the behavior of (Oprove,Overi)
is indistinguishable from (Iprove, Iveri). Thus, the ideal world is
indistinguishable from Hyb1. Similarly, for all i ∈ {2, · · · , n},
Hybi−1 is indistinguishable from Hybi. Because n is bounded
by poly(κ), the ideal world is indistinguishable from Hybn.
Then, the honest nodes in RBA always compute VRF
correctly. So, there is no different for the honest nodes
that whether the VRF is computed locally or is queried
by (Oprove,Overi). Therefore, Hybn is indistinguishable from
RBA.
Combining the arguments above, we have that the ideal
world is indistinguishable from RBA. That is, there exists a
negligible function η such that RBA works the same as the
ideal world except the negligible probability η(κ). Let Xq be
the event that q’s value is the decided by some honest node
conditioned on RBA works the same as the ideal world for
the node q. Let Xq be the event that q’s value is the decided
by some honest node conditioned on RBA does not work the
same as the ideal world for the node q. Combine the result
with Lemma 21, we have that in RBA, for all q ∈ H,
Pr[q’s value is the decided by some honest node] (4)
=Pr[Xq] · (1− η(κ)) + Pr[Xq] · η(κ) (5)
≥ 1
n
· (1− η(κ)). (6)
Thus, RBA achieves strongly fair validity.
APPENDIX C
PROOF IN HBA
A. Agreement
Theorem (Agreement of HBA). Assume t ≤ tmax and the
adversary is adaptive. Regardless of partition, if an honest
node p decides on some value vp and another honest node q
decides on some value vq , then vp = vq . That is, the honest
nodes will never decide on different values.
Proof of theorem 14. The proof is almost the same as the
proof of Theorem 9. For completeness, we state the formal
proof here. We call the commit message with the timestamp
0 (sent in Step 2) comes from the iteration 0. Hence, for each
iteration, an honest node can only commit on one value.
Because p decides on vp and q decides on vq , p and q must
see 2tmax + 1 commit messages of vp and 2tmax + 1 commit
messages of vq , respectively. Suppose both these 2tmax + 1
commit messages come from the same iteration r. According
to the proof of Lemma 8, we have vp = vq .
Suppose the 2tmax+1 commit messages that p receives come
from the iteration rp and the 2tmax+1 commit messages that q
receives come from the iteration rq . Without loss of generality,
we assume rp < rq . Because there are up to tmax Byzantine
nodes, there must be at least tmax + 1 honest nodes commit
on vp so that p can receive 2tmax + 1 commit messages of
vp. For all iterations r > rp, these tmax + 1 honest nodes will
always pre-commit on vp until they see 2tmax +1 pre-commit
messages of v′ 6= vp. However, only 2tmax nodes remain, so
these tmax+1 honest nodes will never pre-commit any v′ 6= vp
for all r > rp. Thus, for all r > rp, if some value v has
2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages, then v = vp.
Because q receives 2tmax +1 commit messages of vq , there
must exist at least tmax + 1 honest nodes that commit on vq
at the iteration rq . These tmax +1 honest nodes commit on vq
only if they have seen 2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages of vq
at iteration rq . Therefore, vq = vp.
B. Termination
Proposition (Termination without partition in static adver-
sary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is static. If all the
honest nodes start HBA within time λ and no partition exists,
all the honest nodes will decide on some values in 4λ, 6.33λ
and t+1 iterations in the best case, the average case and the
worst case, respectively.
Proof of proposition 15. We categorize into two cases:
Case 1: The pioneer is an honest nodes. Because the leader
is honest, it will broadcast the message at the beginning of
HBA. All the honest nodes receive the leader’s value v` and
reply in 2λ. Then, all the honest nodes receive 2tmax +1 pre-
commit message in 3λ. Meanwhile, they broadcast the commit
messages on v`. Thus, all the honest nodes receive 2tmax + 1
commit messages on v` and terminate within 4λ, which is the
best case.
Case 2: The pioneer is a Byzantine node. By theorem 14,
all honest nodes decide either in Step 2 or in Step 4-6 of
some iteration. In the former case, all honest will reach the
termination condition within 4λ. In the latter case, all honest
nodes terminate in t+1 iterations in the worst case according
to Proposition 10.
In expectation, they terminate in 8 rounds according to
Proposition 11. Since the probability of the leader in fast phase
is honest node is 2/3, the expected time of termination is
2
3
· 4λ+ 1
3
· (3λ+ 8λ) = 6.33λ.
Proposition (Termination without partition in adaptive adver-
sary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive. If all
the honest nodes start HBA within time λ and no partition
exists, all the honest nodes will decide on some values in t+1
iterations.
Proof of proposition 16. Because the leader in Step 2 is pre-
determined, the adaptive adversary can always compromise
the leader. This is the worst case in Case 2. in Proposition 15
and we have that all the honest nodes will terminate in t+ 1
iterations by Proposition 10.
Proposition (Fast recovery from a partition in adaptive adver-
sary). Assume t ≤ tmax and the adversary is adaptive. If the
partition is resolved, all the honest nodes will decide on some
values in t+2 iterations. If the adversary is static, it is to be
expected that all honest nodes will decide on some values in
12 rounds.
Proof of proposition 17. Suppose some honest nodes have
decided in the fast mode. Then, after the partition is resolved,
they would broadcast the proof, and all honest nodes will
terminate and agree on the value proposed in the fast mode
in λ. If no honest node has decided in the fast mode, then all
the honest nodes proceed to the normal mode. In this case,
the termination property is exactly the same as RBA and we
have proved it in Proposition 12.
C. Responsiveness
Proposition. Assume the actual network delay is δ, and all
the nodes start HBA within τ time difference. If there is no
partition and the pioneer is honest, all the honest nodes will
decide on some values in τ + 3δ.
Proof of proposition 18. Suppose all the honest nodes start
HBA simultaneously. The honest pioneer broadcasts its value
at clockq = 0. All the honest nodes will receive pioneer’s
value and reply the pre-commit messages in δ. All the honest
nodes will receive 2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages before
clockq = 2δ. Because the pioneer is honest, these 2tmax + 1
messages all pre-commit on the same value. Thus, all the
honest nodes broadcast the commit messages and will decide
in 3δ.
If the pioneer broadcasts its value at clockq = τ for some
node q due to the time difference, q will decide at clockq =
τ + 3δ.
D. Wearkly Fair Validity
Theorem (weakly fair validity). Suppose the network is syn-
chronous. Then, HBA achieves weakly fair validity under the
assumption of static adversary.
Proof of theorem 19. When the node q is elected as the pio-
neer, because the network is synchronous, all the honest nodes
will receive q’s fast message and broadcast the pre-commit
messages on vq before 2λ (we allow honest nodes start the
protocol within λ time drift). Then, all the honest nodes will
receive 2tmax + 1 pre-commit messages on vq before 3λ, so
they all set their lockvalueq on vq . In this case, they will all
terminates on vq . Thus, as long as the network is synchronous,
honest nodes will always terminates on honest pioneer’s value.
Because the pioneer is elected by the permutation of nodes’
public keys, all the nodes will be the pioneer once if HBA is
executed n times. Except that the adversary can forge the
signature (only with negligible probability), all the honest
nodes can propose a value that be decided by all honest nodes
at least bMn c times after HBAis executed M times. Thus,
HBA achieves weakly fair validity.
APPENDIX D
COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
We analyze the communication complexity for RBA and
HBA in Section D-A and Section D-B, respectively.
A. Communication Complexity of Robust Byzantine Agree-
ment
We now analyze the communication complexity of a single
node for a single round in RBA. Because an honest node will
help to propagate the messages, all honest nodes will gossip
O(n) messages in a single round. Thus, the communication
complexity for all nodes is O(n2) in a single round.
As discussed in Section IV-C, if no partition exists or the
system recovers from a partition, RBA terminates in t + 1
iterations in the worst case and is expected to terminate in 8
rounds. We assume n ≥ 3t+ 1, so the protocol terminates in
O(n) iterations in the worst case and is expected to terminate
in O(1) iterations. Therefore, the total communication com-
plexity of the protocol is O(n3) in the worst case and O(n2)
in the expected case.
B. Communication Complexity of Hybrid Byzantine Agree-
ment
Since the core of HBA is actually RBA, except that every
node first enters a fast voting procedure. The average-case
and worst-case communication complexity remain the same.
For the best-case, the upper bound of the communication
complexity is n+ n2 + n2 = 2n2 + n.
C. Communication-Efficient Recovery
Nodes can either actively request data or passively receive
data while nodes suspect a partition happened. As mentioned
in Section II, if a node q recovers from a partition, it should
receive all the previous messages which should be delivered.
In this subsection, we argue that other nodes are not necessary
to send all the received messages but only the messages that
certify the newest status.
Precisely, a node q sends the commit message of v with
2tmax + 1 signatures from different nodes to certify that q
decides on v, the pre-commit message with 2tmax+1 signatures
from different nodes to certify that q locks on the certain
round and v, or pre-commit message with 2tmax+1 signatures
from different nodes to certify the latest iteration at which q
working.
Furthermore, the communication cost can be reduced by
using a threshold signature to compact the 2tmax+1 signatures
into constant size.
